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By John A. E. Pottow

ETROIT’S

REAL CHALLENGE

When Detroit became the largest city in U.S. history to ﬁle for bankruptcy, it was a bad thing—
unless you have the unique world-view of a bankruptcy lawyer, in which case it was marvelous
news, worthy of celebration.
It’s not the fee-generating potential for the Brotherhood that causes bankruptcy lawyers to delight
in Detroit’s ﬁling. It is that the city ﬁnally was forced to confront its unsustainable economic path.
That’s what bankruptcy is all about.
Starting with some basic numbers, on a good year, Detroit can raise about a billion dollars or so
in tax revenue. The problem is that it has accrued about $18 billion in debt (pension, bond, and
otherwise). That means even if it cut every single city service—and residents still chose to remain
and pay taxes in such an unusual place—it would take more than a decade to work it all off.
Many are agitated about allocating the blame; some complain of widespread ﬁnancial
incompetence in prior municipal administrations; others point to the macroeconomic trends
fueling massive depopulation of the nation’s manufacturing hubs. All talk past each other. We are
where we are: an unsupportable debt overhang crippling a city that is trying desperately to
reinvent itself before a demographic death spiral sets in.
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This is where bankruptcy law comes in. Anyone can go broke, but only some get to declare
bankruptcy. One power of bankruptcy law—speciﬁcally, its reorganization branch—is to breathe
new life into struggling debtors by reducing debt pursuant to consensual creditor resolution.
Chapter 11 is world-renowned for its capacity to do just that, capturing the genius of supermajoritarian contract modiﬁcation. When Gov. Rick Snyder, ’82, appointed Kevyn Orr, ’83, as
emergency ﬁnancial manager, Orr engaged the major creditor constituencies almost immediately.
But he faced two problems: one generic to ﬁnancial default negotiations and one speciﬁc to
Detroit. The generic problem is the premise of reorganization law. Creditors holding contract
rights cannot be forced into concessions. Thus, in multi-party talks (Detroit has tens of thousands
of creditors), there is massive holdup potential. Bankruptcy law allows a super-majority, subject to
certain safeguards, to bind dissidents to accept a deal that the collective thinks is fair.
Detroit also faced a special problem with unfunded pension liabilities. The Michigan Constitution
contains a provision purporting to preclude the impairment of pensions, suggesting strongly that
Orr would be powerless to insist upon pension cuts, as would indeed the Legislature, in these
negotiation talks.
Filing for “adjustment” in chapter 9—a municipal analogue to corporate reorganization in
chapter 11—allowed Orr both to tap into bankruptcy’s voting rules and, arguably and
contentiously, to bypass the Michigan constitutional protection. Given that the pension and
health care labor debts constitute billions of dollars of Detroit’s liabilities, the ability to modify
pension obligations is crucial.
Debt restructuring in successful chapter 11s—and in successful chapter 9s—is only half of the
equation. What is equally important is a sustainable go-forward business plan. All cities can do is
raise—or, in Detroit’s case, preserve—the tax base. Yes, it can cut services as population dwindles
to pare costs, but there are certain ﬁxed costs that cannot be cut. Recognizing this touchstone of
reorganization, the city, through Orr, and indeed the bankruptcy judge (Michigan Law Lecturer
Steven Rhodes, ’73, who holds ultimate authority over conﬁrming the plan), have been focused

24

DETROIT 2.0 Bankruptcy

on what the plan for the future is regarding (a) sustainable budgeting, including annual operating
expenses well within revenue targets and with a margin for debt service, and (b) providing for
long-deferred capital expenditures. That’s right, the bankruptcy judge wants to make sure Detroit
will incur enough new debt as part of its plan to deal with its old debt; this outlay is on the order
of magnitude of a billion dollars.
This last point is one that bankruptcy types take seriously. Nobody wants a failed reorganization;
the key to success starts with a truly accurate assessment of ﬁnancial needs. Budgetary realism
has been the hallmark of few municipal governments, and so Detroit’s plan needs to convince the
bankruptcy judge in the short term, and the bond markets in the long term, that a sustainable
level of expenditures is being ﬁnanced, both recurring operations and long-deferred
infrastructure projects.
How does this all shake out with Detroit’s plan in particular? The two big creditor constituencies
are the bondholders and the labor groups (workers and retirees, unionized and not). The
bondholders—or more precisely, their insurance underwriters—are looking at well over a 50
percent haircut on their principal, as of the time this article is going to press, based on the most
recent amended plan that has been submitted for creditor consideration. The workers will hurt
less—but will still hurt—because of an external cash injection from an interesting syndicate of
rich foundations based well outside Detroit and a Michigan governor running for re-election. The
better part of a billion dollars will be thrown in, exclusively to go to pensioners, by these groups
in exchange for the city relinquishing its claims to the artwork at the Detroit Institute of Arts.
These groups have said they’ll throw in this money if the parties agree to a consensual plan (i.e.,
there are enough votes to conﬁrm the plan) and the art is left untouched and protected for future
generations.
Will it work out? Most likely, yes. Hardened bankruptcy lawyers will tell you consensual plans are
the norm in bankruptcy and “cramdown”—a backup procedure for still conﬁrming a plan even
without the requisite voting thresholds met—is the exception. In fact, it’s not entirely clear what
cramdown even means in a chapter 9. In chapter 11, it means the shareholders are all wiped out
and the creditors take over the company. There is no analogue in chapter 9 because there are no
shareholders to wipe out, and private creditors can’t own a public governmental entity.

Bankruptcy law can do a lot, like help recover a fundamentally sound business enterprise that has
been overburdened by debt. But it cannot design cars that people want to drive or make residents
want to live and pay taxes in a city. The true challenge for Detroit is not whether it will conﬁrm
a chapter 9 plan of adjustment, or not even whether it can stick to the new ﬁnancial regime that
plan proposes. It is whether the city leaders, who will remain long after Kevyn Orr has left, can
design a vibrant urban renewal plan, undistracted by the travails of ﬁnancial default. Bankruptcy
can help them escape that distraction, but it cannot deposit creativity into brains.
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Even if likely, it will not be a smooth road to conﬁrmation. The unions are angry because they
don’t think their pensions should have been impaired in the ﬁrst place; they are appealing the
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the Michigan Constitution to the Sixth Circuit. The bond
underwriters are angry because they don’t think they should be taking it more on the chin than
the unions; they have asked for more discovery on the appraisals of the DIA, signaling their
continued belief they are entitled to liquidate those assets. The bondholders will scream that the
city will never get ﬁnancing again in the bond markets. (It will.) The unions will scream that
everyone will quit. (They won’t.) Chapter 9, much like chapter 11, much like corporate
negotiations generally come to think of it, involves no small amount of posturing bravado.
They’ll get there.

Professor John A. E. Pottow is an internationally recognized expert in bankruptcy and commercial law. He has
taught at Michigan Law since 2003.
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